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Through selective attention, decision-makers can learn to ignore behaviorally irrelevant stimulus
dimensions. This can improve learning and increase the perceptual discriminability of relevant
stimulus information. Across cognitive models of categorization, this is typically accomplished
through the inclusion of attentional parameters, which provide information about the importance
assigned to each stimulus dimension by each participant. The effect of these parameters on
psychological representation is often described geometrically, such that perceptual differences over
relevant psychological dimensions are accentuated (or stretched), and differences over irrelevant
dimensions are down-weighted (or compressed). In sensory and association cortex, representations
of stimulus features are known to covary with their behavioral relevance. Although this implies that
neural representational space might closely resemble that hypothesized by formal categorization
theory, to date, attentional effects in the brain have been demonstrated through powerful experi-
mental manipulations (e.g., contrasts between relevant and irrelevant features). This approach
sidesteps the role of idiosyncratic conceptual knowledge in guiding attention to useful information
sources. To bridge this divide, we used formal categorization models, which were fit to behavioral
data, to make inferences about the concepts and strategies used by individual participants during
decision-making. We found that when greater attentional weight was devoted to a particular visual
feature (e.g., “color”), its value (e.g., “red”) was more accurately decoded from occipitotemporal
cortex. We also found that this effect was sufficiently sensitive to reflect individual differences in
conceptual knowledge, indicating that occipitotemporal stimulus representations are embedded
within a space closely resembling that formalized by classic categorization theory.
Keywords: concepts, selective attention, occipitotemporal cortex
Through selective attention, knowledge of abstract concepts can
emphasize relevant stimulus features. For example, although the
size of garments is critical when choosing what to purchase,
weight may be more important when deciding how to ship them.
The attention devoted to individual features is flexibly modulated
according to current goals, transient contextual demands, and
reflects evolving conceptual knowledge (Tversky, 1977; Gold-
stone, 2003). In formal categorization models, a way to account for
this flexibility is through inclusion of attentional parameters,
which reflect the influence of each dimension on the category
decision (e.g., Kruschke, 1992; Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 2004;
Nosofsky, 1986). These attentional parameters are often described
as “warping” multidimensional psychological space, such that
differences along relevant stimulus dimensions are accentuated (or
“stretched”) and differences along irrelevant dimensions are down-
weighted (or “compressed;” Figure 1). Here, we directly test this
classic idea by investigating whether the strength of neural stim-
ulus feature representations are modulated by these attentional
parameters. Importantly, we attempt to relate individual differ-
ences in conceptual knowledge (as revealed by model fits of
attentional parameters) to individual differences in neural repre-
sentation (as revealed by decoding stimulus features in functional
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magnetic resonancing imaging [fMRI] data). In doing so, we aim
to bridge behavioral and neural levels of analysis at the individual
level using cognitive models.
When identifying specific objects, agents must typically con-
sider all stimulus features, and the psychological distance between
stimuli closely reflects their perceptual attributes (Shepard, 1957;
Townsend & Ashby, 1982). During categorization, however,
groups of distinct stimuli must be treated equivalently, and both
learning and generalization can be improved by selectively attend-
ing to relevant stimulus dimensions (Nosofsky, 1986; Shepard,
Hovland, & Jenkins, 1961). Although categorization models differ
in how stimuli are represented in memory (e.g., as individual
exemplars, as prototypes, or as clusters that flexibly reflect envi-
ronmental structure; Love et al., 2004; Minda & Smith, 2002;
Nosofsky, 1987; Nosofsky & Zaki, 2002; Smith & Minda, 1998;
Zaki, Nosofsky, Stanton, & Cohen, 2003), they similarly assume
that categorization involves learning to distribute attention across
stimulus features so as to optimize behavioral performance. Al-
though they differ in their mathematical details, these models also
posit that endogenous (i.e., “top-down”) attentional control (Miller
& Cohen, 2001; Tsotsos, 2011) can modulate the influence of the
exogenous (or perceptual) stimulus dimensions on the behavioral
choice. The attentional parameters play a key role in allowing the
models to capture patterns of human generalization across differ-
ent goals and different rules. As they also predict human eye-
movements during category decision-making (e.g., Rehder &
Hoffman, 2005a, 2005b), they are thought to reflect the strategies
used by individual decision-makers to integrate information from
the external world.
In the brain, effects of endogenous attention have been observed
across the visual cortical hierarchy (Buffalo, Fries, Landman,
Liang, & Desimone, 2010; Jehee, Brady, & Tong, 2011; Kamitani
& Tong, 2005, 2006; Luck, Chelazzi, Hillyard, & Desimone, 1997;
Motter, 1993). A general finding is that when attention is devoted
to a specific visual feature, its neural representation is more accu-
rately decoded. For instance, in human fMRI, when multiple visual
gratings are concurrently presented, representations of attended
orientations in areas V1–V4 are more easily decoded than those
that are unattended (Jehee et al., 2011; Kamitani & Tong, 2005).
Similarly, when random dot stimuli move in multiple directions,
representations of attended motion directions in area MT are
more easily decoded than those that are unattended (Kamitani &
Tong, 2006). Whereas these studies have relied on explicit cues to
guide attention to relevant aspects of the stimulus array, in real-
world environments, decision-makers must typically rely on
knowledge gained through past experience in order to selectively
attend to relevant information sources.
Categorization tasks mirror this aspect of real-world environ-
ments; decision-makers must rely on learned conceptual knowl-
edge in order to selectively attend to relevant stimulus dimensions.
Several studies have investigated whether neural representations of
exogenous information sources are modulated by learned concep-
tual knowledge (e.g., Folstein, Palmeri, & Gauthier, 2013; Li,
Ostwald, Giese, & Kourtzi, 2007; Sigala & Logothetis, 2002).
Sigala and Logothetis (2002), for instance, trained macaques to
categorize abstract images, which varied according to four stimu-
lus dimensions. Neural representations of the two behaviorally
relevant stimulus dimensions (i.e., the dimensions that reliably
predicted the correct response) in the inferior temporal lobe were
enhanced relative to those of the irrelevant dimensions. Using
fMRI with human participants, Li et al. (2007) investigated
whether neural representations of stimulus motion and shape were
influenced by their relevance to the active categorization rule.
Using multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA), they similarly found
that representations of these stimulus dimensions reflected their
relevance to the active rule.
Across studies involving explicit attentional cues and categori-
zation studies involving learned conceptual knowledge, a general
finding is that occipitotemporal representations of behaviorally
relevant information sources are enhanced relative to those that are
irrelevant (this may not hold for integral stimulus dimensions;
Garner, 1976). These effects are compelling, as they imply that
occipitotemporal representational space may closely resemble that
conceptualized by classic cognitive theory (e.g., Kruschke, 1992;
Love et al., 2004; Nosofsky, 1986). Specifically, it may expand
and contract, along axes defined by perceptually separable stimu-
lus dimensions (Garner, 1976), in ways that closely reflect the
idiosyncratic concepts and strategies used by individual partici-
pants during decision-making.
Previous studies have relied on contrastive analyses, in which
neural representations of attended stimulus dimensions are com-
pared to those of unattended dimensions. Although statistically
powerful, this approach defines selective attention in terms of the
experimental paradigm (but see O’Bryan, Walden, Serra, & Davis,
2018), and therefore sidesteps effects associated with indivi-
dual differences in conceptual knowledge (e.g., Craig & Le-
wandowsky, 2012; Little & McDaniel, 2015; McDaniel, Cahill,
Robbins, & Wiener, 2014; Raijmakers, Schmittmann, & Visser,
2014). These effects can be substantial, particularly for ill-
defined categorization-problems (such as the 5/4 categorization
task), which are common in every-day life (Hedge, Powell, &
Sumner, 2017; Johansen & Palmeri, 2002). Here, we bridge this
divide by combining model-based fMRI (Palmeri, Love, & Turner,
2017; Turner, Forstmann, Love, Palmeri, & Van Maanen, 2017)
with multivariate pattern analyses. This allowed us to abstract
away from individual differences in neural topography (Haxby et
al., 2001; Haynes, 2015; Kriegeskorte & Kievit, 2013), to inves-
tigate whether neural stimulus representations reflect individual
differences in conceptual knowledge. Specifically, we sought to
Figure 1. Example: Attention influences psychological space. Left: In an
object identification task, both psychological dimensions should receive
equivalent attention, as they are equally relevant. Right: In a one dimen-
sional rule-based categorization task, only a single dimension is relevant
(in this example, size), and decision-makers could ignore the irrelevant
dimension (shape). This is often described as “warping” psychological
space such that differences along relevant dimensions are accentuated (or
“stretched”), and differences along irrelevant dimensions are down-
weighted (or “compressed”).
2 BRAUNLICH AND LOVE
investigate whether the attentional parameters derived from formal
categorization models predict contortions of occipitotemporal rep-
resentational space during decision-making.
We investigated this hypothesis using two publicly available
data sets (osf.io). In the first (Mack, Preston, & Love, 2013),
participants categorized abstract stimuli that varied according to
four binary dimensions (Figure 2A), according to a categorization
strategy they learned prior to scanning. In the original paper, the
authors fit both the Generalized Context Model (GCM; Nosofsky,
1986) and the Multiplicative Prototype Model (Nosofsky, 1987;
Nosofsky & Zaki, 2002) to the behavioral data, and used them to
compare exemplar and prototype accounts of occipitotemporal
representation. Using representational similarity analysis (Krieges-
korte, Mur, & Bandettini, 2008), Mack et al. (2013) additionally
identified regions of the brain (lateral occipital cortex, parietal
cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, and insular cortex) sensitive to the
attentionally modulated pairwise similarities between stimuli. Al-
though these results (particularly those in lateral occipital cortex)
imply that neural representations of the individual stimulus fea-
tures might be modulated by selective attention, in principle, this
could also reflect modulation within an abstract representational
space where stimulus features are not individually represented. For
instance, although visual cortex reflects sensory input (and is
known to represent individual stimulus dimensions), prefrontal
cortex can flexibly represent conjunctions of features, abstract
rules, and category boundaries in a goal-directed manner. Repre-
sentations in parietal cortex display intermediate characteristics, as
they can reflect both sensory and decisional factors (Brincat,
Siegel, Nicolai, & Miller, 2018; Jiang et al., 2007; Li et al., 2007).
In the second dataset (Mack, Love, & Preston, 2016), partici-
pants learned, while scanning, to categorize images of insects that
varied according to three binary perceptual dimensions (Figure
2B), according to Types I, II, and VI problems described by
Shepard et al. (1961).1 Importantly, although the same stimuli
were included in each task, the degree to which each of the features
predicted the correct choice differed between rules. The authors fit
the SUSTAIN learning model (Supervised and Unsupervised
STratified Adaptive Incremental Network; Love et al., 2004) to the
behavioral data and used it to investigate hippocampal involve-
ment in the development of new conceptual knowledge. Using
representational similarity analysis, they found that SUSTAIN
successfully predicted the pairwise similarities between hippocam-
pal stimulus representations across rule-switches. This suggests
that hippocampal representations are updated according to goal-
directed attentional selection of stimulus features.
Method
Description of Data Sets
In both experiments, participants categorized stimuli that were
characterized by multiple perceptually separable stimulus dimen-
sions. As the mapping of perceptual attributes to their role in each
category structure was randomized for each participant, it is pos-
sible to differentiate effects associated with intrinsic perceptual
stimulus attributes from effects of behavioral relevance. For ex-
ample, while color strongly predicted the correct category choice
for some participants, it provided unreliable informative for others.
In both experiments, participants were not instructed as to which
cues were informative and learned to perform each task through
trial-and-error.
We used the GCM for the first dataset (the winning model from
Mack et al., 2013), as participants learned how to perform the
categorization task prior to scanning. We used SUSTAIN for the
second dataset, as it learns on a trial-by-trial basis, and participants
learned to perform each task during scanning. SUSTAIN was
additionally fit in such a way that the learning of one task carried
over to the next. Importantly, although the GCM and SUSTAIN
differ in how stimuli are represented in memory (i.e., as exemplars
or clusters), they similarly posit that attention “contorts” psycho-
logical space, as illustrated in Figure 1. Thus, these studies and
models provide a good test of whether attention weights in suc-
cessful cognitive models are plausible at both behavioral and
neural levels of analysis.
The “5/4” Dataset. The first dataset (Mack et al., 2013) was
collected while 20 participants (14 Female) categorized abstract
stimuli (Figure 2A), which varied according to four binary stim-
ulus dimensions (size: large vs. small, shape: circle vs. triangle,
color: red vs. green, and position: left vs. right). Prior to scanning,
they learned to categorize the stimuli according to the “5/4”
1 In their paper, Mack et al. (2016) focused on effects associated with the
Type I and Type II rules.
B) SHJ Experiment
A) 5/4 Experiment
Color:
Size:
Shape:
Position:
red
large
circle
left
green
small
triangle
right
Mandible:
Antennae:
Legs:
pincer
thick
thin
shovel
thin
thick
Figure 2. Stimuli. (A) Two of the 16 stimuli used in the “5/4” experiment
are illustrated. The stimuli varied according to four binary perceptual
dimensions: color, size, shape and position. (B) Two of the eight stimuli
used in the SHJ experiment are illustrated. The stimuli were pictures of
insects that varied according to three binary dimensions: mandible shape
(highlighted in green), antennae thickness (highlighted in blue), and leg
thickness (highlighted in red). For both experiments, the mapping of visual
dimension to its role in each category structure (Tables 1 and 2) was
randomized for each participant. See the online article for the color version
of this figure.
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categorization task (Medin & Schaffer, 1978) through trial-and-
error. During this training session, participants were shown only
the first nine stimuli shown in Table 1 (i.e., five Category A
members: A1–A5 and four Category B members: B1–B4), and
experienced 20 repetitions of each stimulus. During the anatomical
scan, they additionally performed a “refresher” task, involving
four additional repetitions on each training item. Each training trial
involved a 3.5-s stimulus presentation period in which participants
made a button press. Following the button press, a fixation cross
was shown for 0.5 s, and feedback was then presented for 3.5 s.
Feedback included information about the correct category, and
about whether the response was correct or incorrect. During scan-
ning, participants were required to categorize not only the training
items, but also the seven transfer stimuli (i.e., T1–T7). In the
scanner, stimuli were presented for 3.5 s on each trial, no feedback
was provided, and stimuli were separated by a 6.5 s intertrial
interval. Over six runs, each of the 16 stimuli were presented three
times. The order of the stimulus presentations were randomized for
each participant.
Whole-brain images were acquired using a Medical Systems
Signa scanner. Structural images were collected using a T2-
weighted, flow compensated spin-echo pulse sequence (TR  3 s,
TE  68 ms, 256  256 matrix, 1  1 mm in-plane resolution, 33
slices, 3-mm slice thickness, gap  0.6 mm). An additional T1-
weighted 3D SPGR structural image was also collected (256 
256  172 matrix, 1  1  1.3 mm voxels). Functional images
were collected using an echo planar imaging sequence (TR  2 s,
TE  30.5 ms, flip angle  73°, 64  64 matrix, 3.75  3.75
in-plane resolution, bottom-up interleaved sequence, gap  0.6
mm).
The SHJ Dataset. In the second dataset (Mack et al., 2016),
23 right-handed participants (11 female, mean age  22.3 years)
categorized images of insects (Figure 2B) varying along three
binary dimensions (legs: thick vs. thin, antennae: thick vs. thin,
and mandible: pincer vs. shovel). We excluded data from two
participants who each had corrupted data on one run. This resulted
in 21 participants for the final analyses. During scanning, partic-
ipants learned to categorize the stimuli according to the Types I, II,
and VI problems described by Shepard et al. (1961; Table 2). In
the Type I problem, the optimal strategy required attending to a
single stimulus dimension (e.g., “legs”) that perfectly predicted the
category label, while ignoring the other two dimensions. In the
Type II problem, the optimal strategy was a logical XOR rule, in
which two stimulus features had to be considered together. In the
Type VI problem, all stimulus features were relevant to the deci-
sion, and participants had to learn the mapping between individual
stimuli and the category label. To maximally differentiate endog-
enous and exogenous factors, the irrelevant feature in the Type II
rule was used as a relevant feature of the Type I problem for each
participant.
Each problem was performed across four scanner runs. Al-
though all of the participants learned to perform the Type VI
problem first, the order of the Types I and II problems was then
counterbalanced across participants. Each trial consisted of a 3.5 s
stimulus presentation period, a jittered 0.5–4.5 second fixation
period, and feedback. Feedback was presented for 2 s and con-
sisted of an image of the presented insect, as well as text indicating
whether the response was correct or incorrect. Each trial was
separated by jittered intertrial interval (4–8 s), which consisting of
a fixation cross. Each run included four presentations of each of
the eight stimuli.
For consistency across data sets, we used the group-derived
region of interest (ROI) used in “5/4” dataset (Figure 3B) and
performed a similar analysis. As participants in the SHJ experi-
ment learned to perform the Types I, II, and VI problems during
scanning, we mirrored the strategy used by the original authors,
and divided the scanning sessions into early (first two runs of each
problem) and late learning epochs (last two runs of each problem).
We investigated the relationship between occipitotemporal repre-
sentation and attention only during this late learning phase, in
which behavior had largely stabilized.
Whole-brain images were acquired using a 3T Siemens Skyra
Scanner. Anatomical images were collected using a T1-weighted
MPRAGE sequence (TR  1.9 s, TE  2.43 ms, 256  256
matrix, 1 mm isotropic voxels, flip angle  9°, field of vision
[FOV]  256 mm). Functional images were acquired using a
T2-weighted multiband (multiband factor  3) accelerated Echo-
planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR  2 s, TE  31ms, flip
angle  73°, FOV  220 mm, 128  128 matrix, 1.7 mm slice
thickness, 1.7 mm isotropic voxels).
SUSTAIN was initialized with no clusters, and with equivalent
weights assigned to each stimulus dimension. Its learning param-
eters were first fit to the learning performance of each participant
using a maximum-likelihood genetic algorithm procedure. The
model was fit in such a way that, after learning one problem, the
resultant model state was used as the initial state for the subsequent
problem. In this way, the model was fit under the assumption that
learning of one task would influence later behavior. Once the
learning parameters of the model were optimized, they were fixed,
and the attentional parameters were extracted from the second two
runs of each task (in which learning had largely stabilized). This
yielded distinct sets of attentional parameters for each participant
Table 1
The “5/4” Category Structure
Stimulus D1 D2 D3 D4
A1 1 0 0 0
A2 1 0 1 0
A3 0 1 0 0
A4 0 0 1 0
A5 0 0 0 1
B1 1 1 0 0
B2 1 0 0 1
B3 0 1 1 1
B4 1 1 1 1
T1 0 1 1 0
T2 1 1 1 0
T3 0 0 0 0
T4 1 1 0 1
T5 0 1 0 1
T6 0 0 1 1
T7 1 0 1 1
Note. Prior to scanning, participants learned, through trial and error, to
categorize the first nine stimuli (Category A: A1–A5; Category B: B1–B4)
illustrated in Figure 2A. During scanning, they categorized both the train-
ing and the transfer (T1–T7) stimuli. Perceptual stimulus dimensions
(Figure 2) were pseudo-randomly assigned to category dimensions for each
participant.
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and each task. More information about the model can be found in
Appendix B.
Image Processing
Preprocessing included motion correction, and coregistration of
the anatomical images to the mean of the functional images (using
statistical parametric mapping [SPM], Version 6470). All MVPA
analyses were performed in native space without smoothing. For
group-level analyses, the statistical maps from each participant
were warped to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) atlas space
using Advanced Normalization Tools (ANTs; Avants, Tustison, &
Johnson, 2009), and then smoothed with a 6 mm full-width at half
maximum Gaussian kernel. The ROI derived from group-level
analyses were transformed back into each participants’ native
space for ROI-level analyses. We performed MVPA on the un-
smoothed, single-trial, t-statistic images (Misaki, Kim, Bandettini,
& Kriegeskorte, 2010) derived from the least-squares separate
procedure (LSS; Mumford, Turner, Ashby, & Poldrack, 2012). We
used SPM to estimate the LSS images for the “5/4” dataset but
used the NiPy python package (http://nipy.org/nipy/index.html)
for the SHJ dataset, as it tends to run more efficiently, and this
study used a multiband sequence with smaller voxel dimensions.
Results
Representations of Individual Visual Features
To identify regions most strongly representing the stimulus
features, we performed a cross-validated searchlight analysis
(sphere radius  10 mm.; Kriegeskorte, Goebel, & Bandettini,
2006)2 in which we decoded each of the four visual features
(position, shape, color and size). We performed the analysis in
native anatomical space, using a linear support vector classifier
(SVC; C  0.1; using the Scikit-learn python package; Pedregosa
et al., 2011) in conjunction with a fivefold, leave-one-run out,
cross-validated procedure. This involved repeatedly training the
model on four of the five runs, and testing whether it could
accurately predict the stimulus features associated with the held-
out neuroimaging data.
After centering each of the resultant statistical maps at chance
(50% for each visual feature), we created a single map for each
participant, which reflected the average, above chance, decoding
accuracy across features. We then normalized each map to to MNI
space and, in order to identify regions supporting above chance
feature decoding, performed a group-level permutation test. This
involved randomly flipping the sign of the statistical maps 10,000
times (using the randomise function from the Oxford Centre for
Functional MRI of the Brain Software Library [FSL]; Winkler,
Ridgway, Webster, Smith, & Nichols, 2014). The familywise error
rate was controlled using a voxelwise threshold of p  .001. This
identified right middle frontal gyrus (BA9) and left postcentral
motor cortex, as well as widespread visual and association cortex,
extending dorsally from occipital pole to the bilateral superior
extrastriate cortex and bilateral intraparietal sulcus, and ventrally
into the bilateral lingual gyrus (see Appendix Table A1). As this
procedure yielded a spatially-distributed pattern of activity, we
increased the minimum t-statistic threshold (from 6.24 to 9) to
isolate voxels most strongly representing the individual stimulus
features. This removed voxels belonging to the bilateral inferior
occipital cortex, left lingual gyrus, bilateral intraparietal sulcus,
and bilateral precuneus. The resultant ROI is illustrated in Figure
3B.
Effects Associated with Conceptual Knowledge
“5/4” Dataset. First, we confirmed that each stimulus feature
could be decoded significantly above chance from the ROI illus-
trated in Figure 3B. Although estimating effect sizes on voxels
selected through nonorthogonal criteria is circular, testing signif-
icance at the ROI-level has been recommended to confirm that
information exists, not only at the level of the searchlight sphere,
but also at the level of the ROI (Etzel, Zacks, & Braver, 2013).
This analysis also allows us to illustrate the individual feature
decoding accuracies for each participant (Figure 3C). The analyses
were performed in the native anatomical space of each participant
using the cross-validated SVC analysis described above (but set-
ting the C parameter to 1 instead of 0.1, which was chosen for the
searchlight analysis to improve computational efficiency).3 Each
feature could be decoded at rates significantly above chance—
shape: M  0.60, SE  0.02, t(19)  5.78, p  .001; size: M 
0.70, SE  0.02, t(19)  9.29, p  .001; color: M  0.54, SE 
0.01, t(19)  3.64, p  .002; and position: M  0.91, SE  0.02,
t(19)  25.96, p  .001.
Next, we investigated whether the decoding accuracy of the
individual perceptual dimensions covaried with the GCM atten-
tional parameters. To do so, we fit a mixed-effects linear regres-
sion analysis (as implemented in the lme4 package for R) using
restricted maximum likelihood. We included fixed-effects terms
for the intercept, the attentional weights, and each visual dimen-
sion (e.g., “color”). We also included random effects terms (which
2 This involves moving an imaginary sphere throughout the brain; re-
peatedly investigating how well the voxels within the sphere can decode a
variable of interest.
3 The C parameter modulates the penalty associated with training error.
With large values, the classifier will choose a small-margin hyperplane,
and training accuracy will be high. With smaller values, out-of-sample
performance is often improved, but more training samples may be mis-
classified. C1 is a common default setting for fMRI.
Table 2
SHJ Category Structures
Stimulus D1 D2 D3 Type I Type II Type VI
1 0 0 0 A A A
2 0 0 1 A B B
3 0 1 0 A B B
4 0 1 1 A A A
5 1 0 0 B A B
6 1 0 1 B B A
7 1 1 0 B B A
8 1 1 1 B A B
Note. Participants learned by trial-and-error to perform the Type I (a
one-dimensional rule-based categorization task), Type II (a two-
dimensional XOR rule-based categorization task), and Type VI (a three-
dimensional task requiring memorization of the individual stimuli) prob-
lems during scanning. For each participant, perceptual stimulus dimensions
(Figure 2) were randomly assigned to these abstract category dimensions.
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were free to vary between participants) for the intercept and the
attention weight parameters. This allowed us to control for base-
line differences in decoding accuracy between participants, and for
shared (group-level) differences in decoding accuracy between
visual dimensions. We used the Kenward-Roger approximation
(Kenward & Roger, 1997) to estimate degrees of freedom (re-
ported below) and used single-sample t tests to calculate p values
for each coefficient (using the pbkrtest package for R; Halekoh &
Højsgaard, 2014).4 We computed 95% confidence intervals (CIs)
using bootstrap resampling (1,000 simulations). The decoding
accuracy of each stimulus dimension positively covaried with the
behaviorally derived GCM parameters (b  0.08, 95% CI [0.01,
0.16], SE  0.04, t(28.71)  2.26, p  .032), indicating that the
decoding accuracy of these representations reflected their impor-
tance during decision-making.
To investigate the sensitivity of occipitotemporal feature repre-
sentations to individual differences in GCM attentional weights,
we conducted a permutation test. This involved shuffling the
attentional weight parameters between participants (i.e., swapping
the weights derived from one participant with those derived from
another), and repeating the regression analysis (described above)
10,000 times. On each permutation, the correspondence for cate-
gory dimensions (i.e., the dimensions depicted in Table 1, as
opposed to the stimulus dimensions illustrated in Figure 1) was
preserved, such that the dimensional weights derived from the
behavior of one participant were assigned to the same dimensions,
but to a different participant.
The unpermuted beta coefficient (b  0.08) was significantly
greater than those composing the null distribution (P  .994),
indicating that the decoding accuracy of the occipitotemporal
representations was sensitive to between-subjects differences in
the attentional weights. This could reflect idiosyncratic differences
in behavioral strategy, and/or effects associated with perceptual
saliency. Therefore, to investigate whether visual salience may
have influenced attention, we conducted a repeated measures anal-
ysis of variance (ANOVA) for the perceptual features. There was
no significant relationship between these visual features and the
attentional parameters, F(3, 57)  0.68, p  .56. A Bayesian
repeated-measures ANOVA (Rouder, Morey, Verhagen, Swag-
man, & Wagenmakers, 2017), additionally indicated that the null
model was 4.65 times more likely than the alternative hypothesis.
4 This provides a more conservative test than the likelihood ratio test or
the Wald approximation (Luke, 2016).
Figure 3. (A) For the “5/4” dataset, a searchlight analysis indicated that binary perceptual dimensions could
be decoded from widespread visual regions (including occipital, temporal and parietal cortex), right inferior
frontal sulcus, and left postcentral motor cortex (the familywise error rate was controlled at the voxel-level p 
.001). (B) To isolate voxels most strongly representing the stimulus features, we raised the statistical threshold,
resulting in the region of interest (ROI) illustrated in yellow. (C) “5/4” dataset binary feature decoding. Red dots
indicate scores from individual participants. (D) SHJ binary feature decoding. The same ROI (B) was used in
both data sets. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
6 BRAUNLICH AND LOVE
These results provide evidence that the observed effects were not
driven by visual characteristics of the stimulus features.
SHJ dataset. First, we confirmed that each stimulus feature
could be decoded significantly above chance from the ROI illus-
trated in Figure 3B. Using a fourfold, leave-one-run out cross-
validation strategy, we used a linear support vector classifier (C 
1) to decode each visual feature across all runs (including both
early and late learning epochs), retaining only estimates for the last
two runs (which corresponded to the late-learning phase in which
behavior had largely stabilized). This fourfold cross-validation
strategy yielded better decoding accuracy than a twofold approach
based on only the last two runs. This improvement reflects the
increased amount of training data available in the fourfold ap-
proach and suggests that the multivariate patterns reflecting the
individual visual features were stable across learning. Each feature
could be decoded at rates significantly above chance (Figure 3D;
antennae: M 0.57, t(20) 3.82, p .001; mandibles: M 0.56,
t(20)  3.22, p  .004; legs: M  0.58, t(20)  4.17, p  .001).
Next, we investigated whether the decoding accuracy associated
with the features covaried with SUSTAIN’s attentional parame-
ters. To do so, we used a mixed-effects linear regression analysis
to predict decoding accuracy from attention weight, visual dimen-
sion, run and rule. As described in the Methods section, distinct
attentional weights were derived for each subject and each rule.
The decoding accuracy for each separate run was included in the
analysis. The model included fixed-effects parameters for these
four variables, and random-effects parameters for the intercept,
attention weight, and run (which were free to vary by participant).
This allowed us to control for differences in decoding accuracy
across visual dimensions and participants (as with the model used
for the “5/4” dataset), while additionally controlling for effects of
rule and idiosyncratic differences in behavioral performance dur-
ing the last two runs. Mirroring the findings from the “5/4” dataset,
we found that the decoding accuracy of these patterns positively
covaried with the attention parameters derived from SUSTAIN
(b  0.09, 95% CI [0.004, 0.17], SE  0.04), t(61)  2.13, p 
.038.
To investigate the sensitivity of occipitotemporal feature repre-
sentations to individual differences in SUSTAIN’s attentional pa-
rameters, we conducted a permutation test similar to that described
above (i.e., for the “5/4” experiment). This involved shuffling the
attentional weight parameters between Participants 10,000 times
(preserving the correspondence for both rule and abstract feature).
This means that the attentional weight derived from the behavior
of one participant, for one particular rule and one particular cate-
gory feature, was assigned to the same rule and feature, but to a
different participant. The slope parameter associated with the
unpermuted data (b  0.09) was significantly greater than those
composing the permuted null distribution (P  .979), suggesting
that the visual feature representations were sensitive to idiosyn-
cratic differences in attentional weights. A repeated measures
ANOVA indicated that the perceptual dimensions did not influ-
ence the attentional parameters, F(2, 44)  1.27, p  .291. A
Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA additionally indicated that
the null model was 1.98 times more likely than the alternative
hypothesis, providing evidence that the attentional weights were
not influenced by visual properties of the stimulus features.
Discussion
Overview
Although differing substantially in how concepts are repre-
sented (e.g., as exemplars, prototypes, or clusters), formal catego-
rization theories (e.g., Kruschke, 1992; Love et al., 2004; Nosof-
sky, 1986) tend to share a similar conception of selective attention.
In these models, conceptual knowledge contorts multidimensional
psychological space such that differences along behaviorally rel-
evant dimensions are accentuated, and differences along irrelevant
dimensions are down-weighted (Figure 1 and Equations 1 and 4 in
Appendix B). In two data sets (Mack et al., 2013, 2016), we
evaluated the neurobiological plausibility of this idea by investi-
gating whether occipitotemporal stimulus feature representations
covaried with attention parameters derived from formal categori-
zation models. We found that this effect was not only apparent at
the group-level but was sufficiently sensitive to reflect individual
differences in conceptual knowledge.
Several previous studies have demonstrated that occipitotempo-
ral stimulus representations are modulated by selective attention
(e.g., Buffalo et al., 2010; Jehee et al., 2011; Kamitani & Tong,
2005, 2006; Luck et al., 1997; Motter, 1993; Reynolds & Chelazzi,
2004; Reynolds, Pasternak, & Desimone, 2000) and by learned
conceptual knowledge (e.g., Folstein et al., 2013; Li et al., 2007;
Sigala & Logothetis, 2002). These studies have relied on statisti-
cally powerful contrastive approaches, in which representations of
attended stimulus dimensions are compared to those of unattended
dimensions. A general finding is that attended stimulus dimensions
are more easily decoded than those that are unattended. This
implies that occipitotemporal representational space might resem-
ble that conceptualized by formal categorization theory (e.g.,
Kruschke, 1992; Love et al., 2004; Nosofsky, 1986). Specifically,
the expansion and contraction of this space might closely reflect
individual differences in the importance assigned to each stimulus
dimension. However, as the contrastive approach defines selective
attention with regards to the experimental paradigm, it is insensi-
tive to individual differences in categorization strategy (e.g., Craig
& Lewandowsky, 2012; Little & McDaniel, 2015; McDaniel et al.,
2014; Raijmakers et al., 2014). Here, we link individual differ-
ences in behavior to individual differences in neural representation
through consideration of the attentional parameters derived from
formal categorization models.
We are not the first to link brain and behavior via latent model
parameters. In the perceptual decision-making literature, for in-
stance, several groups have fit the drift diffusion model (Ratcliff,
1978) to behavioral data, and identified regions of the brain where
the BOLD response reflects variation in its drift rate, bias, and
threshold parameters (e.g., Forstmann et al., 2008; Mulder,
Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, & Forstmann, 2012; Purcell et al.,
2010). As in the present study, several of these studies demon-
strated that individual differences in behavioral strategy are re-
flected in the brain. Instead of linking latent model parameters to
univariate BOLD amplitude, however, we used MVPA to link
latent parameters to multivoxel representations of the stimulus
features. This provided a precise test of the idea that selective
attention contorts neural representational space.
These endogenous attentional effects are thought to arise
through communication with other areas of the brain. In lateral
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frontal cortex, for instance, effects of endogenous attention occur
earlier in time than in occipitotemporal cortex (Baldauf & Desi-
mone, 2014; Bichot, Heard, Degennaro, & Desimone, 2015; Zhou
& Desimone, 2011). Inactivation of these frontal regions (e.g.,
ventral prearcuate sulcus, or entire lateral prefrontal cortex) has
also been associated wtih a reduction in the magnitude of atten-
tional effects in occipitotemporal cortex (Bichot et al., 2015;
Gregoriou, Rossi, Ungerleider, & Desimone, 2014). Interestingly,
contextually sensitive effects of endogenous attention have also
been observed in the lateral geniculate nucleus, suggesting that
some aspects of attention precede those in cortex (McAlonan,
Cavanaugh, & Wurtz, 2008; O’Connor, Fukui, Pinsk, & Kastner,
2002; Saalmann & Kastner, 2011).
Finally, it is worth noting that, although we observed effects of
selective attention across two different stimulus sets (abstract
shapes in the “5/4” experiment, and insects in the SHJ experi-
ment), and across multiple category structures (the “5/4” problem
described by Medin & Schaffer, 1978,, and the Types I, II, and VI
problems described by Shepard et al., 1961), these effects might
not be apparent for all stimuli and tasks. For instance, although
category training can improve perceptual discriminability of rele-
vant stimulus features when stimuli consist of perceptually sepa-
rable features (Garner, 1976), this may not occur for integral
dimensions (Op de Beeck, Wagemans, & Vogels, 2003) or for
stimuli defined according to “blended” stimulus morphspaces
(Folstein et al., 2013). More work is needed to better understand
how attention influences occipitotemporal representations for such
stimuli. One possibility is that selective attention does not warp
perceptual representations of integral stimulus dimensions but
might operate on abstract cognitive or “decisional” representations
in higher-order cortex (Jiang et al., 2007; Nosofsky, 1987).
Conclusions
Category training is known to induce changes in both perceptual
(Folstein, Gauthier, & Palmeri, 2012; Goldstone, 1994; Goldstone,
Steyvers, & Larimer, 1996; Gureckis & Goldstone, 2008; Op de
Beeck et al., 2003) and neural sensitivity (e.g., Dieciuc, Roque, &
Folstein, 2017; Folstein et al., 2013; Folstein, Palmeri, Gauthier, &
Van Gulick, 2015; Li et al., 2007; Sigala & Logothetis, 2002). In
two data sets, we demonstrate that occipitotemporal stimulus rep-
resentations covary with the attentional parameters derived from
formal categorization theory. This effect was sufficiently sensitive
to reflect individual differences in conceptual knowledge, which
implies that these occipitotemporal representations are embedded
within a space closely resembling that predicted by formal cate-
gorization theory (e.g., Kruschke, 1992; Love et al., 2004; Nosof-
sky, 1986).
By linking brain and behavior through the latent attentional
parameters of cognitive models, we also link two (somewhat)
disparate literatures. In the neuroscience literature, effects of se-
lective attention are typically examined using highly structured
decision problems, and selective attention is investigated by con-
trasting different aspects of the experimental design (i.e., relevant
vs. irrelevant stimulus dimensions). In the cognitive categorization
literature, researchers have focused on developing models that
accurately account for behavioral patterns of generalization across
different goals and tasks. Our results indicate that these cognitive
models can be used to examine effects of selective attention in the
brain. This is the case, even for ill-defined decision problems (such
as the “5/4” task), as the models are able to successfully account
for individual differences in conceptual knowledge.
Context
Brad Love has a longstanding interest in models of categoriza-
tion. He developed the SUSTAIN model (Love et al., 2004) used
here and subsequently became interested in how to theoretically
relate such models to the brain (Love & Gureckis, 2007). Later, he
used category learning models in model-based fMRI analyses,
such as in the two papers from which this contribution draws its
data (Mack et al., 2013, 2016). Through several papers, Kurt
Braunlich has investigated neurobiological mechanisms associated
with categorization and generalization. Recently (Braunlich, Liu,
& Seger, 2017), he found that occipitotemporal category represen-
tations are highly flexible, in that they are sensitive to transient
generalization demands (i.e., strict vs. lax decision criteria). This
dovetails with the present work, which examines attentional effects
associated with task demands.
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Appendix B
Computational Models and Attentional Parameters
For the first dataset (Mack et al., 2013), we considered the
generalized context model (GCM; Nosofsky, 1986), which posits
that conceptual knowledge consists of memory for individual
exemplars. For the SHJ experiment (Mack et al., 2016), we con-
sidered the attentional parameters from SUSTAIN (Supervised and
Unsupervised STratified Adaptive Incremental Network; Love et
al., 2004). Details about the models can be found in the original
papers. Here, we provide a brief overview of each.
GCM
In the GCM (Nosofsky, 1987), the psychological distance, d
between stimuli i and j can be calculated as the attentionally-
weighted sum of their unsigned differences across dimensions, k:
dij
k
wk  xik xjkr1⁄r, (1)
where w indicate the attentional parameters assigned to each
dimension. The r parameter is set to 1 (city-block distance) for
perceptually separable stimulus dimensions (as in the “5/4” data-
set), and r is set to 2 (Euclidean distance) for integral dimensions
(Garner, 1976). Similarity is an exponentially-decaying function of
psychological distance:
sij dcdij, (2)
where the shape of the similarity gradient is influenced by the
sensitivity parameter, c. The probability of choosing Category A,
given stimulus, i, is given by the choice rule:
P(Ai) aA
sia

aA
sia bB sib
 , (3)
where  governs the degree of deterministic responding.
SUSTAIN
SUSTAIN is a semisupervised clustering model, which incre-
mentally learns to solve categorization problems by first applying
simple solutions, and then increasing complexity as required.
Through experience, the model can learn to group similar items
into common clusters and can make inferences about novel stimuli
based on its perceptual similarity to existing clusters (i.e., based on
perceptual similarity, clusters compete to predict latent stimulus
attributes). When unexpected feedback is received, the model can
also learn in a supervised fashion by creating a new cluster to
represent the novel stimulus.
In SUSTAIN, all clusters contain receptive fields (RF’s) for
each stimulus dimension. As new stimuli are added to the cluster,
the model learns by adjusting the position of each RF to best match
the cluster’s expectation for novel stimuli. As the RF is an expo-
nential function, a cluster’s activation, , decreases exponentially
with distance from its preferred value:
()	e	, (4)
where  represents the distance of the stimulus dimension value
from the cluster’s preferred stimulus dimension value, and where
	 represents the tuning (or width) of the RF. The 	 parameters are
specific to dimensions, but are shared across dimensions, and so,
like the attentional parameters in the GCM, the 	 parameters in
SUSTAIN modulate the influence of each stimulus dimension on
the overall decision outcome.
The overall activation of a cluster, H, involves consideration of
each dimension, k:
H

k
(	k)e	kk

k
(	k)
, (5)
(Appendices continue)
Table A1
“5/4” Dataset Binary Feature Decoding: Searchlight Results
Size x y z t BA Region
23972 14 
74 4 12.717 18 Calcarine_R
28 
62 54 10.5 7 Parietal_Sup_R

54 
18 44 7.256 3 Postcentral_L
233 50 24 26 7.447 48 Frontal_Inf_Tri_R
22 
46 12 44 6.621 9 Frontal_Mid_L
Note. The familywise error rate was controlled at the voxel level (p  .001).
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where the  parameter (which is always non-negative) modulates
the influence of the 	 parameters on the choice outcome. When 
is large, attended dimensions (which are associated with large 	
values, and narrow RFs), dominate the activation function (Eq. 5);
when  is zero, the 	 parameters are ignored, and all dimensions
exert equal influence on the choice.
SUSTAIN was fit to the SHJ dataset in a supervised fashion,
using the same trial order experienced by the participants; it was
also fit across rule-switches, such that learning from one task was
carried over to the next. Thus, SUSTAIN was capable of reflecting
learning, as well as carry-over effects associated with previously
learned rules.
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